mehnatSupreme Court decisions wherein approval of use of FIR as evidence has occurred
Top of PageFive judgments of the Supreme Court are cited here to illustrate the range of circumstances whereunder an FIR can be treated as evidence. [21][22][23][24][25]
Damodarprasad Chandrikaprasad & others vs State of Maharashtra
Top of PageDamodarprasad Chandrikaprasad & others vs State of Maharashtra was decided by the Supreme Court in 1971.
Supreme Court
Equivalent Citations: 1972 AIR 622; 1972 SCR (2) 622;
Damodarprasad Chandrikaprasad & others vs State of Maharashtra
Date of Judgment: 29/11/1971
Decided by a single judge of the Supreme Court of India
Ray, A.N. (J)
Held (in the 8th paragraph of the judgment):
"...In certain cases, the first information report can be used under section 32(1) of the Evidence Act or under section 8 of the Evidence Act as to the cause of the informant's death or as part of the informer's conduct. ..."
Tehal Singh and others vs State of Punjab
Top of PageThe main legal issue decided in Tehal Singh and others vs State of Punjab was whether it is necessary for a statement made by a deceased person to have been made in anticipation of death in order for it to be treated as substantive evidence.
Supreme Court
Equivalent Citations: AIR 1979 SC 1347; 1979 CriLJ 1031; 1980 Supp (1) SCC 400;
Tehal Singh and others vs State of Punjab
Date of Judgment: 27/10/1978
Decided by a division bench of the Supreme Court of India
Singh, J. (J)
Reddy, O.C. (J)
Held (in the 4th paragraph of the judgment):
"...We do not also see any force in the suggestion of Dr. Chitaley that the statement of Harmel Singh was not made in expectation of death and was, therefore, not entitled to weight. Apart from the fact that Section 32 of the Evidence Act does not require that a statement should be made in expectation of death, it is clear from the evidence that the condition of Harmel Singh was serious at that time. ..." (emphasis supplied)
Rattan Singh vs The State of Himachal Pradesh
Top of PageSupreme Court
Equivalent Citations: (1997) 4 SCC 161;
Rattan Singh vs The State of Himachal Pradesh
Date of Judgment: 11/12/1996
Decided by a division bench of the Supreme Court of India
Anand, A.S. (J)
Thomas, K.T. (J)
Held (in the 15th paragraph of the judgment):
"Even apart from section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the aforesaid statement of Kanta Devi (i.e. the deceased person being discussed - MU) can be admitted under section 6 of the Evidence Act on account of its proximity of time to the act of murder. ..." (emphasis supplied)
Further held (in the 16th paragraph of the judgment):
"In either case, whether it is admissible under section 32(1) or under section 6 of the Evidence Act, it is substantive evidence which can be acted upon with or without corroboration in finding guilt of the accused."
George & others vs State of Kerala & Another
Top of PageIn George & others vs State of Kerala & Another, the Supreme Court declared that if the informant whose complaint was the basis of any FIR turns hostile in court and says from the witness stand that he did not complain at all, then the particular FIR can firstly in no circumstances be used as substantive evidence, and secondly it cannot be used even for the purpose of corroborating or contradicting the said informant.
Supreme Court
Equivalent Citations: [1998] 4 SCC 605;
George & others vs State of Kerala & Another
Date of Judgment: 18/03/1998
Decided by a division bench of the Supreme Court of India
Mukherjee, M.K. (J)
Quadri, S.S.M. (J)
Held (in the 30th paragraph of the judgment):
"...Before proceeding further we must confess that we have not able to fathom how the trial Court could rely upon the contents of Ext. P.1 (i.e. exhibit number 1 used by the prosecution, which in this case was the concerned F.I.R. – MU), lodged by P.W.1, and that too for the purpose of discarding the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4. P.W.1 turned hostile and testified that he did not make any statement before the police but signed on the dotted lines. It is trite that an F.I.R. is not substantive evidence (unless of course it is admitted under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act) and can be used to corroborate or contradict the maker thereof; and therefore, the question of corroborating P.W.1 by his purported statements, as contained in Ext. P.1 could not arise. In spite thereof the trial Court observed `.......the first informant statement is further supported by the evidence of P.W.1' and used the statements contained therein (Ext.P.1) as substantive evidence to discredit P.Ws.3 and 4. It must, therefore, be said that the approach of the trial Court in dealing with the F.I.R. was legally impermissible. ..." (emphasis supplied)
Kans Raj vs State of Punjab & others
Top of PageIn Kans Raj vs State of Punjab & others, the Supreme Court held that the whole of Section 32 (and not just Section 32(1)) of the Indian Evidence Act is an exception to the rule of exclusion of hearsay.
Nitpickers might say that the implications of this finding / declaration, upon the small matter of whether or not every FIR containing one or more statements under the said section is to be treated as being admissible as substantive evidence, were not expounded in detail by the full bench of the SC which delivered the verdict in this case. This is true. But this does not mean that this judgment is not binding in this respect, quite the opposite in fact.
Supreme Court
Equivalent Citations: AIR 2000 SC 2324(1); (2000) 5 SCC 207;
Kans Raj vs State of Punjab & others
Date of Judgment: 26/04/2000
Decided by a full bench of the Supreme Court of India
Pattanaik, G.B. (J)
Sethi, R.P. (J)
Patil, S.V. (J)
Held (in the 11th paragraph of the judgment):
"Section 32 of the Evidence Act is admittedly an exception to the general rule of exclusion to the hearsay evidence and the statements of a person, written or verbal, of relevant facts, after his death are admissible in evidence if they refer to the cause of his death or to any circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death. ..." (emphasis supplied)
Further held (also in the 11th paragraph of the judgment):
"...To attract the provisions of Section 32, for the purposes of admissibility of the statement of a deceased the prosecution is required to prove that the statement was made by a person who is dead or who cannot be found or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense or he is incapable of giving evidence and that such statement had been made under any of the circumstances specified in sub-sections (1) to (8) of Section 32 of the Act. ..."
Further held (also in the 11th paragraph of the judgment):
"...To make such statement as substantive evidence, the person or the agency relying upon it is under a legal obligation to prove the making of such statement as a fact. If it is in writing, the scribe must be produced in the Court and if it is verbal, it should be proved by examining the person who heard the deceased making the statement. ..."
References:
Top of Page21)Damodarprasad Chandrikaprasad & others vs State of Maharashtra on 29 November, 1971; Indiankanoon.org; Delhi; Undated; Retrieved on 30th May 2021
22)Tehal Singh and others vs State of Punjab on 27 October, 1978; Indiankanoon.org; Delhi; Undated; Retrieved on 30th May 2021
23)Rattan Singh vs The State of Himachal Pradesh on 11 December, 1996; Indiankanoon.org; Delhi; Undated; Retrieved on 30th May 2021
24)George & others vs State of Kerala & Another on 18 March, 1998; Indiankanoon.org; Delhi; Undated; Retrieved on 30th May 2021
25)Kans Raj vs State of Punjab & others on 26 April, 2000; Indiankanoon.org; Delhi; Undated; Retrieved on 30th May 2021